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A. No. 23091.

In Bank.

ELSAN H. STAFFORD, Appellant, v. THE LOS ANGELES
COUNTY EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT BOARD
et al., Respondents.
[1] Counties- Officers and Boards- Retirement and Pensions.Under County Peace Officers' Retirement Law (now codified
as Gov. Code, §§ 31900-32082), term "beneficiary" is not
lilllited to one
receiving a pension but includes one
having right to a future retirement allowance, since a contrary
view would render Gov. Code, § 32081, meaningless and would
defeat declared policy of § 32080 that disability benefits shall
not be cumulative with workmen's compensation benefits
awarded for same disability.
[2] Id.- Officers and Boards- Retirement and Pensions.-Withholding of pension benefits to member of county peace ofil.cers'
retirement system until such benefits, otherwise payable, equal
amount of his workmen's compensation award as is required
by Gov. Code, §§ 32080, 32081, does not violate workmen's compensation provisions of Lab. Code, § 3751, since all code sections are basically of equal sanction as enactments of Legisture, and since the Government Code sections, being later in
time and part of a particular and specific law dealing with
retirement benefits of county peace officers, must be held to
prevail if any conflict exists.
[3] Id.- Officers and Boards- Retirement and Pension.-Compliance with Gov. Code, § 32081, withholding pension benefits
to member of county peace officers' retirement system until
such benefits, otherwise payable, equal amount of workmen's
compensation award, will not constitute an exaction or receipt
by employer from employee of a contribution in violation of
Lab. Code, § 3751, but may be construed as fixing or defining
a period during which pension payments will be suspended.
[ 4] Statutes- Construction- With Reference to Other Laws.Every statute should be construed with reference to whole
system of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and have effect.
[1] Vested right of pensioner to pension, notes, 54 A.L.R. 943;
98 A.L.R. 505; 112 A.L.R. 1009; 137 A.L.R. 249. See, also, Cal.
Jur., Pensions, § 4; Am.Jur., Pensions, § 24.
[4] See Cal.Jur., Statutes, § 161; Am.Jur., Statutes, § 339 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1-3, 5] Counties, § 37.1; [ 4] Statutes,
§ 187.

796

STAFFORD

v. L. A.

ETC. RETIREMENT BOARD [ 42

C.2d

[5] Counties- Officers and Boards- Retirement and Pensions.Vested rights of member of county peace officers' retirement
system in his pension are not impaired by retirement board's
compliance with provisions of Gov. Code, §§ 32080, 32081, requiring withholding of pension benefits until such benefits,
otherwise payable, equal amount of workmen's compensation
award, where those provisions were in effect when member
first became a peace officer and when he was retired.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Frank G. Swain, .Tudge. Affirmed.
Proceeding in mandamus to compel payment of a pension.
Judgment of dismissal affirmed.
Elsan H. Stafford, in pro. per., for Appellant.
Harold W. Kennedy, County Counsel (Los Angeles), and
Edward H. Gaylord, Deputy County Counsel, for Respondents.
SCHAUER, J.-Petitioner, a retired deputy sheriff of
the County of Los .Angeles, seeks mandamus to compel respondent County Employees' Retirement Board to pay him
a pension. A general demurrer to his amended petition for
the writ was sustained without leave to amend, and he appeals
from the ensuing judgment of dismissal. We have concluded
that the trial court correctly determined that petitioner is
not entitled to the payments he seeks, and that the judgment
should be affirmed.
Petitioner alleges that he entered the service of the county
as a deputy sheriff in August, 1946. He was injured in line
of duty, and in January, 1950, was retired by reason of resulting disability. In May, 1950, the Industrial Accident
Commission awarded him $5,603.53, which was paid in a
lump sum by State Compensation Insurance Fund, the workmen's compensation insurance carrier for the county. Petitioner thereafter applied to respondent board for payment
of a pension. .Acting assertedly pursuant to, and in reliance
upon, the provisions of section 32081 of the Government
Code, hereinafter (p. 797) quoted in all material parts, the
board refused to make any payment on account of the pension
until (using the language of subdivision (a) of section 32081)
"the total amount of the retirement payments which would
otherwise be paid equals the total amount received [by petitioner] under the workmen's compensation act.''
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Petitioner's pension rights are set forth in the County
Peace Officers Retirement Law (now codified as Gov. Code,
§§ 31900-32082), passed by the state in 1931, and adopted by
Los Angeles County pursuant to the provisions of section
31930. 1 Section 32055 provides that "Upon retirement of
a member for service connected disability, he shall receive
an annual pension, payable in monthly installments, equal
to one-half of his terminal salary, not to exceed two hundred
fifty dollars ( $250) a month." Section 32080 declares that
"It is the intention of this chapter [the Retirement Law]
that pensions allowed for injury incurred in line of duty
shall not be cumulative with the benefits under workmen's
compensation awarded for the same injury or disability."
Section 32081, hereinbefore referred to and relied upon by
respondent board, provides that "If any beneficiary receives
compensation under any workmen's compensation act or by
virtue of any judgment obtained against the county . . . for
disability arising out of and in the course of the employment of
a member or pensioner, the benefits shall be modified as follows:
"(a) If the amount is paid in one sum . . . the beneficiary
shall not receive any retirement payments until the total
amount of the retirement payments which would otherwise
be paid equals the total amount received under the workmen's
compensation act or by virtue of the judgment . . . "
[1] Petitioner first contends that section 32081 does not
apply to him because section 31908 states that" 'Beneficiary'
means any person in receipt of a pension, or other benefit
provided by the retirement system.'' Since, says petitioner,
he has not yet received a pension he is not a beneficiary
as that term is used in section 32081. However, section 31903
declares that "Unless the context otherwise requires, the
definitions and general provisions contained in this article
govern the construction of this chapter." It seems clear
that the context of section 32081 requires that petitioner be
included within the term "beneficiary," as otherwise the
entire section would appear to apply to no one and to be
meaningless. It is not to be assumed that the Legislature
indulged in an idle act. (Scheas v. Robertson (1951), 38
· Cal.2d 119, 129 [238 P.2d 982] ; see also Stafford v. Realty
1
Government Code, section 31930: "This chapter shall become effective in any county upon its acceptance by ordinance passed by fourfifths vote of its board of supervisors. and becomes operative in the
county on .January 1st or .July 1st following the expiration of three
months after the passage. of the ordinance.''
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Bond Service Corp. (1952), 39 Cal.2d 797, 805 [249 P.2d
241].) ::V1oreover, a
view would defeat the de<;]ared policy of sedion 32080 that disability pensions shall
not be cumulative with workmen's compensation benefits
avvarded for the same disability In addition, as pointed
out by respondent, the right to a future retirement allowance
has been held to be a "benefit"
Palaske v. City of Long
Beach (1949), 93 Cal.App.2d 120, 124-127 [208 P.2d 764] ),
thus bringing petitioner within the section 31908 definition
of "beneficiary" as one who is in receipt of some "other
benefit provided by the retirement system.''
Petitioner also contends that because he contributed
to the fund from which his pension is to be paid, the result
of the withholding of pension benefits from him until such
benefits, otherwise payable, equal the amount of his workmen's compensation award is to cause him to contribute to
the cost of such award, in violation of the provisions of
section 3751 of the Labor Code. 2 This contention likewise is
untenable as applied to the facts of this case. In the first
place, both section 3751 of the Labor Code and sections 32080
and 32081 of the Government Code (pursuant to which the
pension payments are being withheld) are basically of equal
sanction as enactments of the Legislature. Section 31902
of the Government Code expressly declares that the Retirement Law ''shall not be construed as a local measure.'' The
Workmen's Compensation Act, including the provisions upon
which Labor Code section 3751 is based, was enacted in 1913.
The Retirement Law, including the provisions of Government Code sections 32080 and 32081, was enacted in 1931.
Therefore, if it be deemed that a conflict exists between
the provisions of the Labor Code section and those of sections
32080 and 32081, the latter sections, being later in time, must
be held to prevail. (Nelson v. Reilly (1948), 88 Cal.App.2d
303, 306 f198 P .2d 694].) Also, since the Retirement I~aw
is a particular and specific law, dealing with the retirement benefits of county peace officers, its provisions must be
held to prevail over the general workmen's compensation provisions expressed in section 3751 of the Labor Code. (See
Board of Supervisors v. Simpson
) , 36 Cal.2d 671, 673
f227 P.2d
; Rose v. State of
(1942), 19 Cal.2d
2
Labor Code, section 3751: ''No employer shall exact or receive from
any employee any contribution, or mnke or take any deduction from the
earnings of any employee either directly or indirectly, to cover the whole
or any part of the cost of compensation under this division. Violation
of this section is a misdemeanor."
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WhitfemoTe v.
(1946),
.2d 212]; 23 CaLTur.
lt appears, however, tlmt there is no (~onfiic:t between
the two statutory
and that
with section
32081 of the Government Code will not constitute an exaction
or receipt by the employer from the employee of a contribution, in violation of Labor Code section 3751. Rather, section
32081 may be construed as fixing or defining a period during
which pension payments will be
[4] "[E]very
statute shonld be construed with reference to the whole system
of law of which it is a part so that all may be harmonized and
have effect. [Citations.]" (Stafford v. Realty Bond Service
Corp. (1952), supra, 39 Cal.2d 797, 805; see also Rose v.
State of California (1942), s~tpra, 19 Cal.2d 713, 724; 23 Cal.
,Jnr. 784-785, and cases there cited.) .Although this construction
may be considered to re:mlt in a reduction in the amount of
pension payments vvhieh the retired officer would otherwise reeeive, it may be noted that under the terms of section 32064 of
the Government Code a reduction (even complete termination, prior to amendment of the provision in 1947) may also
occur if the officer engages in public employment other than
service in the armed forces of the United States.
Cases relied upon by petitioner are neither compelling nor
persuasive to a contrary holding. Larson v. Board of Police
etc. Cornmrs. (1945), 71 Cal..App.2d 60, 62 [162 P.2d 33];
Johnson v. Board of Police etc. Pension Com mrs. ( 1946),
74 Cal..App.2d 919, 921 [170 P.2d 48]; and Holt v. Board
of Police etc. Commrs. (1948), 86 Cal..App.2d 714, 719-720
[196 P.2d 94], all deal with a section of the Long Beach city
charter which stated that "This provision is intended to be
in lien of and take the place, in so far as it applies, of the
\Vorkmen 's Compensation, Insurance and Safety .Act . . .
and any person who would be entitled to a pension under
the provisions of this amendment and who applies for a
pension hereunder shall be deemed to have waived all provisions under the -workmen's Compensation, Insurance and
Safety .Act . . . " (See p. 62 of 71 Cal.App.2d.) It was
held that the charter provision, a matter of local concern,
could not constitute the pension provisions a substitute for
workmen's compensation. .As pointed out in the Holt case
(p. 719 of 86 Cal.App.2d), however, the charter did not
provide that workmen's compensation was to be in lieu of
and take the place of the pension provisions, and none of
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the cited eases passes upon such a situation.
v. Ind·us~
, 41 Cal.2d 118, 121 [258 P.2d 1],
concerns a Los Angeles
charter
that if an
employee entitled to a pension because of injury is granted
workmen's compensation, then his pension should be construed as such compensation and
in payment of the
award. The city was permissibly uninsured for workmen's
compensation. It was held that the general workmen's compensation law must prevail over the local charter provision
in case of conflict between the two, and that "the validity
of'' any credit given the city against the workmen's compensation award ''depends upon whether Healy contributed to
the pension for which the credit was allowed and whether
as a result of the credit he was required, directly or indirectly,
to pay part of the cost of his compensation in violation of
section 3751" of the Labor Code. However, as already
noted, in the case presently before us the retirement law
provision under which defendant acted is a part of general
state law rather than a local charter provision, and the payments which are deferred or reduced are those of the pension
rather than of the compensation award. An Alameda city
ordinance which was construed to likewise require reduction
of pension payments in case of payment of workmen's compensation was upheld against a similar contention of conflict
with the workmen's compensation act, in Foster v. Pension
Board (1937), 23 Cal.App.2d 550, 554-555 [73 P.2d 631].
Other contentions by petitioner are without merit and
appear to have been abandoned by him. [5] For example,
it was suggested that his vested rights in his pension were
in some manner impaired by defendant's compliance with
the provisions of section 32080 and 32081 of the Government
Code. However, those provisions were in effect both when
petitioner first became a deputy sheriff and when he was
retired; consequently his pension rights were neither altered
nor impaired during or after his service for the county.
For the reasons above stated the judgment is affirmed.

trial Ace. Com.

Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Traynor, J., and Bray, J. protem.,*
concurred.
Spence, J., concurred in the judgment.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority holding requires an employee to contribute
*Assigned by Chairman of J udieial Couneil.
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to workmen's compensation payable to him contrary to the
eonstitutional and statutory policy of this state. It is of
little consequenee that the payments of disability pension
are to be withheld up to the amount of the workmen's compensation received by the employee rather than that the
pension was credited against the compensation as was the
case in Healy v. Industrial Ace. Com., 41 Cal.2d 118 [258
P.2d 1]. That involved merely a matter of time and method
of accomplishing the illegal result. Under the pension law
the county employee was required to and did contribute to
the pension fund. Now that contribution is taken from him
because he has received workmen's compensation, that is,
payment of his pension to which he contributed is withheld
because he received workmen's compensation. He is, in
effect, and for all practical purposes, paying part of the
workmen's compensation to which he is entitled without
contribution by him.
The policy of this state envisions no such contribution.
The Constitution provides for a complete system of workmen's
compensation. ''The Legislature is hereby expressly vested
with plenary power, unlimited by any provision of this Constitution, to create, and enforce a complete system of workmen's compensation, by appropriate legislation, and in that
behalf to create and enforce a liability on the part of any
or all persons to compensate any or all of their workmen
for injury or disability, and their dependents for death incurred or sustained by the said workmen in the course of
their employment, irrespective of the fault of any party. A
complete system of workmen's compensation includes adequate provisions for the comfort, health and safety and general welfare of any and all workmen and those dependent
upon them for support to the extent of relieving from the
conseqttences of any in}ttry or death incurred or sustained
by workmen in the course of their employment, irrespective
of the fault of any party; also full provision for securing
safety in places of employment; . . . full provision for adequate insurance coverage against liability to pay or furnish
compensation; . . . all of which matters are expressly declared to be the social public policy of this State, binding
upon all departments of the State government." (Cal. Const.,
art. XX, § 21 ; emphasis added.) The Legislature has implemented this policy by providing that: "No employer
shall exact or receive from any employee any contribution,
42 C.2d-26
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or make or take any deduction from the earnings of any
either directly or indirectly, to cover the whole
of the cost of eompensation under this division.
of this section is a misdemeanor." (Lab. Code,
§ 3751.) And: "Liability for compensation shall not be
reduced or affected by any insurance, contribution or other
benefit whatsoever due to or received by the person entitled
to such compensation, except as otherwise provided by this
division." (Lab. Code, § 3752.) Nothing could be more
specific than the last quoted provision. Contrary to the
majority opinion it is more specific than the pension law
(Gov. Code, § 31900 et seq.) and if there is a conflict, it
controls.
California Jurisprudence, after referring to sections 3751
and 3752 of the Labor Code, states: "Accordingly contributions or benefits received from a labor union during a strike
may not be deducted from the disability indemnity payable
under the act. And when the employer takes out accident
insurance in favor of the employee, out of whose wages the
premiums are eventually payable, such workman is entitled
to the benefits under the policy in addition to those to which
he is entitled under the statute, and the employer may not
set off against compensation due from him any amounts paid
under the policy." (27 Cal.Jur. 513.) The rule is settled
that the payment of salary or wages does not prevent an
award of workmen's compensation for disability and the
salary is not to be deducted from the compensation unless
there is express provision therefor. (Department of Motor
Vehicles v. IndttstTial Ace. Com., 14 Cal.2d 189 [93 P.2d 131] .)
The pension act cannot, under the Constitution (art. XX,
§ 21, supra) require that the employee contribute toward the
payment of his compensation. As seen, that constitutional
provision states that it is the policy of this state that there
shall be a liability on the part of employers to pay compensation to their employees; that the employee shall be relieved
of the consequences of an industrial injury. If the employee
has to contribute to the payment of his workmen's compensation the employer is to that extent not liable and the employee
to that extent has not been relieved of the consequences of
the injury. The underlying principle of a complete system
of workmen's compensation which is the constitutionally declared policy of this state is that compensation for injuries
shall be borne by industry as a part of the cost of production.
(Union Iron Wks. v. Industrial Ace. Com., 190 Cal. 33 [210
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P. 410) ; Employers' Liab. Assur. Corp. v. Industrial Ace.
Com., 179 Cal. 432 [177 P. 273); Western Metal Supply Co.
v. Pillsbu1·y, 172 Cal. 407 [156 P. 491, Ann.Cas. 1917 E 390];
Western Indemnity Co. v. Pillsbury, 170 Cal. 686 [151 P.
398].) It must necessarily follow that no contributions to
the payment of workmen's compensation can be required of
the employee. 'l'herefore the pension act cannot constitutionally require such contribution. If it is argued that there is
no contribution but only less pension payable to the employee,
then what becomes of the contribution to the pension fund
by the employee? Either the portion he supplied is taken
away from him or he is required to help pay the workmen's
compensation which he is entitled to receive without contribution and in either case he has been deprived of at least a
portion of that to which he is lawfully entitled under the
workmen's compensation law. It seems clear to me that if
the Legislature may provide, in the face of article XX, section 21, of the Constitution, that an injured employee who
receives workmen's compensation may be barred from receiving a pension from a fund to which he has contributed, it
may also bar him from receiving payments under a policy
of health and accident insurance on which he has paid all
the premiums, or from receiving other benefits from welfare
agencies to which he has made contributions in order to secure
such benefits. Under the majority holding here such legislation would be upheld. In my opinion it would violate the
above cited constitutional mandate.
I would, therefore, reverse the judgment.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied .Tune 9,
l!JM. Carter, ,J., was of the opinion that the petition should
be granted.

